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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has agreed to retain this appeal. Jurisdiction is 
established by Utah Code Ann., Section 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES ON REVIEW and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant's 
(hereafter "Strebeck") request for a full hearing on Restitution, which request was 
made pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 77-38a-302(4). 
2. Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion when it increased, sua sponte, 
Strebeck's monthly restitution requirements without considering all of the "relevant 
facts" as required by Utah Code Ann., Section 77-38a-302(5)(b). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this case, which should apply to both of the 
aforementioned issues, is the same as it was in the Utah Court of Appeals case, State v. 
Miller. See Miller, 170 P.3d 1141 (Utah App. 2007). In Miller, this Court stated: 
... (w)e will not disturb a trial court's order of restitution unless 
the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or 
abuses its discretion ... Furthermore, '(w)hether a restitution 
(award) is proper ... depends solely upon interpretation of the 
governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a 
statute presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness ... ' Id. at 1143. 
PRESERVATION FOR APPEAL 
" ... To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must have been presented to the trial court 
in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on that issue ... " Main St. v. Easy 
Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004). As the record shows, Strebeck asked the Court for 
a hearing on restitution and was denied. R. 185 and 198. Also, at the same time, the 
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Court ruled on a sua sponte increase in the monthly restitution amount when it enacted 
said increase. R. 198. Thus, both issues are preserved for appeal. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OR RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann., Section 77-38a-302(4-5). See addendum for complete statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is simply an appeal of a lower court's denial of a restitution hearing 
request and subsequent sua sponte order of a restitution payment increase. These 
issues arose when Strebeck made a written "Request for Restitution Hearing" on August 
29, 2014. The Court later denied the request at an evidentiary hearing which was held 
on an Order to Show Cause, unrelated to this appeal. 
Strebeck now appeals the increase and the denial of his request for a hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Strebeck pleaded guilty to both 2nd Degree Felony Securities Fraud and 2nd Degree 
Felony Theft on April 9, 2012. R. 68. 
2. He was later sentenced to 1-15 years in prison, suspended, and ordered to pay 
$3,834,300 in restitution to the victims of the crimes. R. 95. 
3. Pursuant to the terms of his sentence and probation, Strebeck faithfully made each 
monthly payment of his restitution as ordered by the Court. 
4. Strebeck was even accused of violating the payment provisions on two different 
occassions, but was found not to be in violation by the lower to court. R. 133 and 160. 
5. After the lower court's restitution judgment, Strebeck made several payments to the 
victims by other means, including bankruptcy settlement, civil judgments and other 
payments which he thought would offset the final restitution amount. 
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6. Contemplating these payments and offsets, which all took place subsequent to the 
judgment, Strebeck requested that the lower court grant him a full hearing on the 
imposition, amount and distribution of the restitution on August 29, 2014. R. 185. 
7. The lower court determined that it would hear Strebeck's request for a restitution 
hearing at an upcoming evidentiary hearing on the State's Order to Show Cause. R. 
192. 
8. The day of the hearing arrived and the issues regarding the State's Order to Show 
Cause were heard. However, the Court declined to allow Strebeck a hearing to 
review his restitution, stating that Strebeck could have appealed the restitution two 
years earlier. R. 198. 
9. Additionally, after hearing evidence from both sides, but nothing having to do with the 
elements required by Utah code, the lower court, sua sponte, raised Strebeck's 
monthly restitution payment requirement from $850 per month to $1,500 a month. Id. 
10. Strebeck filed his notice of appeal of those decisions on November 14, 2014. R. 
212. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Strebeck requested a full restitution hearing and was denied the same. His 
reasons for requesting the same are not part of the record and are irrelevant. He was 
never given the chance to argue the statutory factors which should buttress a restitution 
~ judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISALLOWED A FULL RESTITUTION 
HEARING BECAUSE UTAH CODE ALLOWS THE SAME WHEN DEFENDANT 
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OBJECTS TO THE SUBSEQUENT IMPOSITION, AMOUNT OR DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESTITUTION 
At issue is whether or not Strebeck should have been allowed a full hearing on 
restitution, subsequent to his sentencing. 
Utah Code, Section 77-38a-302(4), also called The Crime Victim's Restitution 
Act, states that " ... (i)f the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue ... " 
A. RESTITUTION HEARINGS MAY BE HELD AFTER DISPOSITION 
In the case State v. Poulsen, this Court heard a challenge to a restitution 
judgment where the extant defendant, feeling that he did not get a full restitution hearing 
subsequent to his sentencing, asked for a remand for the same. See Poulsen, 288 P.3d 
601 (Utah App. 2012). In remanding for a full restitution hearing in Poulsen, this Court 
stated: 
Here, the court determined that complete restitution was 
$168,400 and ordered restitution of $60,000. (Defendant) 
thus walked out of a restitution hearing lasting several 
minutes subject to a civil judgment of $168,400 without ever 
having had the opportunity to test the factual underpinnings 
of that award. We do not believe our Legislature 
contemplated such cursory process when it adopted the 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. .. " Id. at 606. 
Like the defendant in Poulsen, even after a hearing request, Strebeck has likewise not 
been able to test the "factual underpinnings" of his restitution judgment, either 
immediately after sentencing or since. Also, as Poulsen shows, no objection need be 
made immediately upon entry or imposition of a restitution judgment. Id. Nowhere in 
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Poulsen, did the defendant make any such objection, and nowhere did the extant court 
require him to do so, yet he was allowed the futl hearing on remand. Id. 
Similarly, Strebeck made no objection at the time of the initial judgment, as 
pointed out by the trial court. However, the law does not require such an objection in 
order to have a subsequent hearing on the subject of restitution. 
The Court's attention is directed to the language of the statute. It uses the words 
and phrase "imposition" and "distribution of the restitution". U.C.A. 77-38a-302(4). It is 
obviously implied that imposition takes place after a judgment, as does distribution. If it 
were the case that failure to object at the outset were a block to later adjudication of the 
judgment, then the Statute's goal to allow review of imposition and distribution could 
never be accomplished. Poulsen and the Statute show that a hearing should be 
allowed, even at a time relatively remote from the original judgment. 
This Court also noted the allowance of a restitution hearing after the initial 
judgment in the case State v. Ruiz. See Ruiz, 305 P.3d 224 (Utah App. 2013). In Ruiz, 
~ this Court noted, and, in Strebeck's opinion endorsed, the practice of restitution 
hearings held after sentencing. Id. (See, for example, " ... (defendant) ... was sentenced to 
two years in jail ... The trial court then held a restitution hearing to receive evidence 
relating to the cost of (v)ictim's therapy ... Id. at 225). 
Thus, as the Statute and aforementioned cases show, it was no error for 
~ Strebeck to request a hearing after a restitution judgment had been entered, even 
though he entered no objection at the time of entry. 
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It is important to know: Strebeck does not desire to oppose the restitution 
judgment itself. He desires the hearing so that he can show subsequent payment and 
receive credit for the same so that his judgment amount may be reduced. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUA SPONTE INCREASE IN STREBECK'S MONTHLY 
RESTITUTION PAYMENTS CAME WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH 
CODE BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER RELEVANT FACTORS 
The Crime Victim's Restitution Act also requires a court to consider many factors 
when determining not only the "monetary sum" of restitution but also "other conditions" 
relating thereto. U.C.A. 77-38a-302{5)(b) and (c). Some of these factors are: 
1. " ... the financial resources of the defendant. .. " 
2. " ... the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to other obligations 
of the defendant..." 
3. " ... the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis ... " 
4. " ... the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment..." 
5. " ... other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate ... " 
Id. at (5)(c)(i-vi). 
This Court denied an appellant's request for the overturning of a restitution award 
in the case State v. Beckstrom. See Beckstrom, 307 P.3d 677 (Utah App. 2013). In that G) 
case, this Court reasoned that the defendant did not warrant any further hearing 
because " ... the record clearly indicate(d} that the court considered the burden that the 
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restitution order would impose on (d)efendant in light of her other financial obligations ... " 
Id. at 685. 
Unlike Beckstrom, Strebeck's case has no record of any such analysis. 
However, even if such an analysis was made at some point, the Statute allows further 
consideration of the same in relevance to "other conditions" relating to restitution. See 
U.C.A. 77-38a-302(5)(b-c). While it is not on record in this case, because the request 
for a hearing was denied, Strebeck desired the hearing so that he could show how 
circumstances had materially changed since the original judgment. The Statute 
contemplates just such an inquiry and it was denied here. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant requests that the lower court's denial 
of his restitution hearing be reversed and remanded and that the lower court's arbitrary 
increase of the same be reversed until a full hearing, with proper statutory analysis, can 
be held. 
~ Dated this 22nd day of June, 2015. 
CHAMBERLAIN LAW 
Isl Nicholas I. Chamberlain 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was delivered, via U.S. Mail, to: 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Criminal Appeals 
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
this 22nd day of June, 2015. 
Isl Nicholas Chamberlain 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code Ann., Section 77-38a-302(4-5) 
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ADDENDUM #1 
77-38a-302. Restitution criteria. 
(1) 
When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102( 14) and in determining whether restitution 
is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections ill 
through .(il. 
(2) 
In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
(a) 
"Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused 
by the defendant. 
(b) 
"Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the 
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year 
after sentencing. 
(c) 
Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection 
ru. 
(3) 
If the com1 determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the court 
shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) 
If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) 
(a) 
For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to 
pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal 
conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) 
In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) 
the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
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(ii) 
the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical or 
mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a 
method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) 
the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a 
victim; 
(v) 
up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or 
damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential 
to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) 
the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) 
In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court 
shall consider: 
(i) 
the factors listed in Subsections ill(fil and {hl; 
(ii) 
the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial declaration described in 
Section 77-38a-204; 
(iii) 
the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(iv) 
the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be 
fixed by the court; 
(v) 
the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(vi) 
other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) 
(i) 
Except as provided in Subsection {5){d){ii), the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of sentencing if 
feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) 
Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after 
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) 
The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an order of 
judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on October 16, 2014) 
COURT BAILIFF: Fifth District Court in and for the 
County of Washington, the State of Utah, is now in session with 
the Honorable Judge G. Michael Westfall presiding. Be seated. 
THE COURT: Good morning. The time is one minute after 
9 o'clock on the 16 th of October. Welcome to Fifth District 
Court. The matter on the calendar this morning is an evidentiary 
hearing in the case of State vs. Alan Wayne Strebeck, case 
111500728. Let's see, just a moment. I think -- and -- just a 
moment while I pull up the file. 
This initially was scheduled, I believe, for an 
evidentiary hearing on an order to show cause in which the State 
is claiming that Judge Beacham had ordered the defendant's 
probation not expire without restitution being paid in full, and 
that the defendant's probation is going to expire next June and 
he's not even close to paying the restitution on the schedule 
currently. 
MR. JAEGER: That is true. In fact, not only is he not 
close, he owes more money -- quite a bit more money today than he 
owed --
THE COURT: With the accrued interest? 
MR. JAEGER: -- with the accrued interest. 
THE COURT: So that everybody is on the same page -- and 
I want to talk to Mr. Chamberlain in just a moment, because 
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there's some issues he wanted to address today as well. So what 
is it you're seeking from this hearing today? 
MR. JAEGER: Your Honor, I'm seeking an extension of his 
probation. I do have the case law that backs my authority to 
extend that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JAEGER: It's the --
THE COURT: And you think it's appropriate to start that 
now, to address the extension now instead of waiting until next 
June? 
MR. JAEGER: Yes, your Honor. The reason why is because 
he owes so much money. I mean 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JAEGER: -- it's just absolutely clear that it's 
just not --
THE COURT: Okay. So you're asking 
MR. JAEGER: going to be able to be repaid back. 
THE COURT: -- for an extension. What else are you 
asking for today? 
MR. JAEGER: We would also be asking for periodic 
reviews, and that's what Judge Beacham had actually ordered, and 
so that the Court can make a determination as to whether the 
defendant is paying sufficient amount towards restitution. 
THE COURT: So periodic reviews. What you're contemp 
what you want me to do now is to set up periodic reviews, and 
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then you're contemplating that the defendant would then come into 
court and we'd find out what his income is, what his expenses 
have been to see if there should be a change in the amount of 
restitution payments each month? 
MR. JAEGER: That is correct. 
THE COURT: What's he ordered to pay right now? 
MR. JAEGER: It's $850. 
THE COURT: Each month? 
MR. JAEGER: Each month, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. How much is the interest that's 
accruing on that 3 million plus restitution judgment? 
MR. JAEGER: Well, it's over 100,000 that he owes in 
MR. KEHL: It's $183,225.36. 
THE COURT: So each month. How much is the restitution? 
MR. KEHL: I don't know. He just came on my caseload 
a couple of months ago, and I've been following up with 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: I haven't done the math, so what --
MR. JAEGER: Yeah, we could break that down and 
determine that. 
THE COURT: What is the interest rate that 
--
MR. JAEGER: It's only 2 percent. 
THE COURT: So it's --
MR. KEHL: I think it's between 2 and 4. 
MR. JAEGER: Yeah. 
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THE COURT: It's the 2 percent. Well, but 2 percent 
on --
MR. JAEGER: But because of the significant amount of 
money, he's not even covering the 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JAEGER: Yeah, not even covering the interest. 
THE COURT: All right. Has he been making the $850 a 
month? 
MR. JAEGER: He has been making the payments, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. So today what you want me to do 
is to extend -- and you're not claiming that he's violated his 
probation yet. 
MR. JAEGER: No, but we do actually have to find -- in 
order to extend it, the case law says that -- and I have here 
again, a copy for the Court and a copy for defense Counsel. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. JAEGER: Basically to extend it, we have to show 
the defendant that the defendant's only initiative to pay 
restitution is a threat of incarceration, and we --
THE COURT: Only incentive. 
MR. JAEGER: Yeah. To extend it, yeah. We believe that 
is the case, and we believe -- and that's what we're going to 
show the Court today, and we believe that that's exactly what 
Judge Beacham ordered and as part of his order was that that 
was his concern, too. 
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THE COURT: All right. You think we're okay proceeding 
now instead of waiting until May? 
MR. JAEGER: Your Honor, if the Court -- I would like to 
take evidence today, and I guess ultimately the Court can 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JAEGER: -- decide if he wanted to give him 
additional time, but I believe it's so clear that the defendant 
is not going to be in a position to pay that, it --
THE COURT: All right. I'll allow you to present 
evidence. I just from --
MR. JAEGER: Yeah. I guess if the defendant is going to 
say that he can have it paid off, or a significant amount paid 
off by May, then I'm not necessarily opposed to giving him until 
May, but I believe that's not the case, and I believe that's why 
it's appropriate to proceed today. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. Thank you. Now 
Mr. Chamberlain, so -- now we all understand why we're here 
today. Do you object to the extension of probation and the 
request that I have periodic reviews? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Your Honor, I think to the extent that 
probat -- that restitution and the other probation conditions are 
correctly determined, that we can object to an extension of 
probation. It was clear in Judge Beacham's sentence that 
probation was not to be terminated until restitution was paid. 
The sentence, convenient for all of us, was reduced to 
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writing. As you look at the sentence and what it states, it just 
simply says that yes, he has to be on probation until that's 
paid, and that if he hasn't paid at the end of the 36 months that 
was initially ordered, that probation be extended. So I don't 
know that it's too much of an issue that we need to argue about 
that point. Now we're here today to talk about -- we've 
requested that we have a hearing on the amount of restitution 
and its imposition. 
THE COURT: Right. I understand that, but I want to --
the first thing that I want to understand is whether or not you 
object to my ordering -- I mean do I need to take evidence? Do 
you want me to take evidence regardless of whether they stipulate 
to what you're hearing from -- or what you're asking for? 
MR. JAEGER: Well, your Honor, I believe the evidence 
that I'm presenting is two part. Part one would be for the 
extension, and part two would -- to address Mr. Chamberlain's 
request for a change to the restitution amount. 
THE COURT: Right, but there's a difference between your 
bearing the burden and trying to persuade me to do something and 
your responding to what Mr. Chamberlain wants me to do. 
MR. JAEGER: But if he's willing to stipulate that 
probation should be extended, then I'm fine with that, and then 
I'd be willing to move on to the next part of his request to 
reduce the restitution. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just check one thing here. 
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I'm looking at Judge Beacham's order, and you talked about the 
periodic reviews, and I'm not seeing that in his order. 
MR. JAEGER: And I am prepared to address that today. 
That's one of the things that I'm prepared to address is -- and 
actually play Judge Beacham's ruling and then to address that 
that was the understanding of the parties. 
THE COURT: How often do you want the ruling -- or the 
reviews? 
MR. JAEGER: Originally Judge Beacham was going to set 
it once a year, but I would actually ask for more like six 
months, every six months. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you want a review every six 
months? 
MR. JAEGER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you object to that? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Then -- all right. But you 
don't object to the request that proba -- that probation be 
extended because it doesn't appear likely he's going to be able 
to pay restitution before the June -- June of 2015? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: That is true because that's what Judge 
Beacham ordered initially. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's see what this says. 
All right. Well, that being the case, then I'm going to grant 
your request to extend probation for 36 months beyond the date 
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that it was normally scheduled to expire, because that's --
there's no opposition to that, and actually there appears to be a 
stipulation to that. 
With regard to the request for periodic reviews, there's 
an objection to that, so I'll hear your evidence on that, and 
then we'll move to Mr. Chamberlain's issues. You want me to 
reconsider what Judge Beacham did and change the restitution 
amount? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: We would just simply like the 
defendant to be given credit for what has already been paid in 
the restitution, and the initial amount that was ordered was 
either inaccurate or has been reduced. So we just want to make 
sure that there is an accurate determination of what the 
restitution truly is. 
THE COURT: Okay. You claim he has not been given 
credit, so you think that he should -- that this should --
judgment should not accrue interest? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: No, I think it should accrue interest, 
but for the true principal amount, which hasn't been determined 
yet. The $3.8 million is not an accurate reflection of what the 
actual restitution should be on the case. 
THE COURT: But that's what Judge Beacham ordered --
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Well, he also 
THE COURT: -- and he signed an order almost over two 
years ago. 
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MR. CHAMBERLAIN: But the statute that I'm prepared 
to assert now -- and do you want me to give you my argument now 
or --
THE COURT: Yeah, I'd like to know where you're coming 
from with regard to that. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Okay. Great. Great. I would direct 
the Court's attention to Utah Code Section 77-38A-302. 
THE COURT: Just a minute, 77-38A-302. Okay. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Specifically Section 4 of that statute 
says if the defendant objects to the imposition amount or 
distribution of the restitution, the Court shall allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. That's all it says. 
There's no time requirement that is attached to that. It's 
simply if there's an objection to the amount then a hearing can 
be held on it, and so that's what we're objecting to, the amount. 
THE COURT: You're saying that there was an objection? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that was pointed out to Judge Beacham? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Oh, at the time, no, but we would also 
say that the statute itself doesn't require that the objection be 
given at the time. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take care of this 
one really quickly. You had an opportunity to appeal. You 
didn't appeal. If that's the basis for your decision, it's 
denied -- or your request, it's denied. You can appeal my 
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decision. Let's see what the Court of Appeals says, okay? 
I mean you could have -- you could file -- possibly file 
a post conviction relief claim. I don't know if that would apply 
or not, but you can't come back to me and just simply make a 
motion for me to overrule what Judge Beacham did two years ago 
when you didn't appeal his decision. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Let me ask you this, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: With that ruling being in place, if 
there's been payments that have been applied since the sentencing 
has been handed down, it seems that we would also be able to at 
least determine what the restitution amount would be now. If 
he's made payments since that sentencing, then that would be at 
least something that could be reviewed. 
THE COURT: That depends on whether the statute 
indicates that the payments are to be applied first to accrued 
interest or to the principal amount. My understanding has always 
been that's applied first to accrued interest, and $3.3 million 
at 2 percent interest, I'm -- let's see, it's 3 -- 3.8, right? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: It's 3.8. Let's just grab the 
judgment amount. 
THE COURT: That's $6,000 a month in interest. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Okay. 
THE COURT: So my understanding is that the payments 
have been applied first to interest. Let me look at the Court's 
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accounting and see. 
MR. JAEGER: Your Honor, I believe it's actually going 
through AP&P. 
THE COURT: Oh, that's right. Is it going through AP&P? 
MR. JAEGER: And he does have that information, and he's 
checked with them. That is my understanding, too, and that's why 
it's going to the interest and that's why --
THE COURT: And I'll hear that with regard to whether 
the defendant is being given proper credit for the payments that 
he's made. I'll hear evidence on that if you want me to. 
MR. JAEGER: Your Honor, I'm hearing from my client that 
he did actually object at the time of the sentencing to the 
amount, and so --
THE COURT: Well, then he should have appealed. He 
could have appealed what Judge Beacham did, and he didn't. Now 
it's just too late. 
I'm -- quite frankly, I'm getting a little bit 
frustrated because I get -- this didn't happen to me when I first 
became a judge up in Cedar City. People weren't asking me to 
change what other judges had done, and yet I am seeing 
frequently seeing motions for me to go back and change what Judge 
Shumate did, and now to change what Judge Beacham did. 
There's an appropriate procedure to do that, and that is 
to file an appeal if you don't agree with what he did, and that 
wasn't done. I'm not going to -- we're not going to reopen that 
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issue now two years later. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Your Honor, I would also like to 
address the principal versus the interest payments. I have a 
statute that I can read to the Court that might be --
THE COURT: Yeah, what is the statute? What's the one 
you're looking at? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: It's 77-38A-401. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm looking at that. Where are 
you -- which one? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Specifically it says in Section (5), 
"The department shall make rules permitting the restitution 
payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of 
payments credited to interest in accordance with statute." So I 
think that would be instructive as to which direction payments go 
first. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that what AP&P has been doing, or 
have they been crediting it just to princ -- to the interest? 
MR. KEHL: It just goes to the interest. It's all one 
lump sum. 
THE COURT: Okay. I was not aware of this particular 
statute. Has the department made rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited principal first? 
MR. KEHL: I don't know, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think that I would need to know that, 
because if they had made rules, this authorizes them to make 
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